Especially since Donald Trump entered the political arena, progressive politicians, celebrities, media figures, and academics have relentlessly told the country that the Republican Party has become the party of the far Right, a party bent on whipping up white racial anxieties and antagonisms to eke out a few more electoral wins before the multicultural “coalition of the ascendant” takes power. This narrative is often built on the bad behavior of a few small groups or individuals, or on the former president’s most recent outrageous remarks.

Fortunately for all of us, this narrative is false. The relevant data give scant indication that the typical Republican voter has “radicalized” or has suddenly become committed to a white-supremacist agenda. In fact, under Trump, the party made unprecedented gains among minority voters. Although it was quickly overshadowed by the insanity of January 6, the decline of racial polarization in voting patterns was one of the most important developments in the 2020 election cycle.

This is not esoteric knowledge. It was plainly demonstrated by the exit-poll data. Yet this development has received shockingly little attention — probably because it does not align with the stories people want to believe about the state of U.S. politics. Fortunately, Patrick Ruffini has done us all a great service by explaining the very important but underexamined trends occurring among working-class voters of all races and ethnic groups.

Ruffini is a respected Republican pollster with a long career in politics. He has credibility on these issues, and although his new book, Party of the People, is dense, it is extremely readable. It also offers an optimistic message in an era when doomsaying is the norm.

For a generation, progressives have assured themselves that a new era of Democratic dominance is right around the corner. After all, the groups that lean toward Democrats (non-whites, unmarried women, those with college degrees) are growing, whereas most shrinking groups (whites, Christians, people with less education) tend to vote Republican. The math is undeniable.

And yet, the stable, long-term Democratic majority never seems to emerge. President Obama’s big Democratic majority in Congress ended after the 2010 “Tea Party” election. Hillary Clinton was defeated. President Trump came surprisingly close to securing reelection. What happened?

One important development, which Ruffini notes, is the surging support for Republicans among white voters without college degrees — many of whom voted twice for President Obama. The Republican ceiling on this vote turned out to be higher than many analysts expected, and their shift to the right put many Democratic states (especially in the Midwest) back in play. Progressives could still hold out hope that this development was a mere speed bump on the path to dominance. After all, the white working class is also a shrinking demographic.

The more interesting development, which is potentially more important for long-term voting patterns, is the shift among non-whites to the Republican Party in recent election cycles. In 2020, as Ruffini notes, “in most of America’s non-white communities — especially those filled with first- and second-generation immigrants — Trump did better than he had in 2016.” Trump made impressive inroads among Hispanic voters, especially in Texas and Florida. President Biden won in large part because he significantly outperformed Clinton among whites with college degrees.

There is no question that the fastest-growing groups have tended to vote Democratic recently, but it is also true that Republican gains among those groups are offsetting the Democratic advantage, consistently pushing back the day when demographics alone crushes the GOP.

Like Ruffini, I responded optimistically to the 2020 exit-poll data. My concern was that this apparent shift toward Republicans among certain minority groups would prove to be ephemeral. If this change is occurring because these voters find the Republican platform increasingly compelling, the party is in good shape. But what if these new Republican voters are attracted to Trump primarily for his intangible characteristics — his humor and charisma, his combativeness, etc.? Those will be harder traits for future candidates to replicate, and those Republicans who try to mimic Trump’s rhetorical style rarely enjoy similar levels of support and enthusiasm.

According to Ruffini, however, there are signs that recent Republican gains among Hispanics, Asians, and working-class whites will prove durable and that, with a sound policy agenda and proper messaging, they have room for further growth. Although the 2022 midterms were disappointing for the GOP, “Republicans had their best midterm ever with Hispanic voters.” African Americans remain the toughest demographic group for Republicans, but even here support for Democrats may be wavering. Republicans also made modest gains among blacks in 2022.

Ruffini uses multiple methods to make his argument, which is one of the book’s greatest strengths. He visited and interviewed people in some of the most politically interesting regions of the country. Ruffini is especially impressed with political developments in Florida, calling it “the model for the Republican multiracial future, a rising Republican bastion where non-white voters will be close to the majority in 2036 and where Hispanics vote close to how the state as a whole does.” His discussion of the Rio Grande Valley in Texas was especially fascinating, and it provides a useful reminder that we should not simply assume that Hispanics are single-issue voters on immigration — or that they even agree with the Left on that issue.

Ruffini notes that, as the Democratic Party has become the party of the college-educated, it has moved sharply to the left on cultural issues. This alienates culturally conservative working-class voters of all races. “Wokeness” is politically toxic if you are trying to appeal to them, he suggests, and Republicans are benefiting from progressive overreach.

Ruffini is an expert in quantitative analysis, but readers with no knowledge of polling or statistics will be able to follow his arguments with ease. He is genuinely enthusiastic about the prospect of a more inclusive and multicultural Republican Party, but he is not just a Republican partisan. He looks forward to an era of diminished racial and ethnic polarization in politics, something all patriotic Americans should work to facilitate.

Republicans will find this a very encouraging book. But they will be making a mistake if they take it for granted that current trends will continue indefinitely. Furthermore, even if all the data Ruffini provides are accurate and portend future Republican wins, the GOP’s gains among the working class may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory.

Ruffini is a pollster and an election strategist, and this book aligns with his expertise and interests. It would be unfair to complain that he did not write an entirely different book. As he knows, however, there is more to politics and policy than counting votes. On Election Day, one person’s vote counts just as much as anyone else’s. When it comes to real-world political influence, though, true equality is not a realistic aim. We should therefore consider which party’s coalition is likely to be effective at pursuing political and policy goals and avoiding internal dysfunction. Based on the trends Ruffini documents in his book, I predict an advantage for Democrats, despite the many difficulties they face in satisfying their diverse constituencies. The GOP’s vanishing support from college-educated voters is a major problem for the party.

A college degree is not compelling evidence that someone is smart, nor does it indicate that someone is a superior democratic citizen. Higher education in the United States needs serious reform, and we should make it clear that there are other paths to economic and social success in this country. Those caveats aside, college degrees are a useful proxy for a party’s human capital.

The party of the college-educated will have an advantage in finding competent, public-spirited people to take positions as congressional staffers and bureaucrats. It will be the party with more sympathetic coverage from journalists. It will enjoy high-dollar donations from the economic and cultural elites. Its values will be promoted by the popular media and the educational institutions.

It is great for the GOP to make inroads among blue-collar workers in the Rust Belt. Republicans should be delighted to welcome Latino Evangelicals who reject progressive cultural values. I hope the GOP follows Ruffini’s advice and promotes policies that improve their lives. But these are probably not the people who will determine the nation’s long-term trajectory. In a democracy, a party that appeals only to the elites will not be successful. Yet a party with very little support from elites will also face major challenges.

This is a tricky period for both parties. Elements of the Left are very uncomfortable sharing the Democratic Party with wealthy, influential moderates. As long as Wall Street is a major player in the Democratic Party, significant economic redistribution is probably off the table.

For Republicans, their new status as a lowbrow, economically downscale party may make them permanently unattractive to Americans who like to think of themselves as cultural or economic elites. This problem may sometimes be just as aesthetic as substantive. The MAGA movement can be criticized for many things, but its tackiness and crudity alone may be sufficient to keep many people away. Yet returning to a stodgier variety of GOP conservatism could repulse many working-class newcomers.

Ruffini’s insightful book will prove valuable for Republican strategists, and I hope he is right that working-class voters of all races will continue shifting toward the party. Republicans should not be complacent, however. They face today an important challenge: To win the future, they must consolidate and grow their support among the groups Ruffini discusses, while simultaneously clawing back enough elite support to effectively govern.