Slow on Sudan

IN June 2001, Nina Shea, the director of Freedom House’s Center for Religious Freedom, believed she could count on the pro-Israel lobby’s support for legislation on human rights in Sudan. At the time, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s top priority for Congress was the renewal of sanctions against foreign oil companies doing business with Iran and Libya. The top priority for Shea’s impromptu coalition—black congressmen, evangelical Christians, Southern Baptists, and social conservatives—was to punish foreign oil companies fueling Sudan’s military campaign against Christians and animists in the country’s 19-year civil war.

Shea, therefore, wanted to amend the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) to include Sudan. AIPAC did not want to weigh its legislation down with amendments that might jeopardize its passage. So the two sides reached a compromise: AIPAC’s legislative director, Brad Gordon, promised AIPAC’s support for the Sudan Peace Act, and in exchange Shea’s coalition promised to drop support for the Sudan amendment on ILSA.